South Africa
Source: bricsconnect.co

In this week’s round-up:

• Trump is isolating America, says Jeffrey Sachs
• Magazine warns about Trump’s BRICS policy
• Cuba and BRICS strengthen alliance at FIHAV 2025
• Cross-border payment system stalled — Russian Finance Minister
• South African students shine on global stage

‘Donald Trump is isolating America,’ says Jeffrey Sachs 

Jeffrey Sachs delivers one of his sharpest critiques yet—arguing that Donald Trump’s refusal to attend the G20 summit reflects a deep “American neurosis” driven by China’s rise, the BRICS expansion, and the collapse of U.S. global dominance. Sachs claims the European and American imperial ages are ending, while emerging economies are reshaping the world order.

Magazine warns about Trump’s BRICS policy 

Foreign Affairs, the influential Council on Foreign Relations’ bi-monthly magazine, published an intriguing article titled “Losing the Swing States: Washington Is Driving the BRICS to Become an Anti-American Bloc”. It was co-authored by the CEO of the Center for a New American Security think tank and his Research Associate. The gist of their article is that Trump 2.0 has recklessly worsened the US’ ties with BRICS members India, Brazil, and South Africa at the risk of radicalising their foreign policies.

Cuba and BRICS strengthen alliance at FIHAV

The forum on economic integration mechanisms, “Cuba and its Global Alliances,” opened within the framework of the Havana International Fair (FIHAV 2025), promoted by the Ministry of Foreign Trade and organised by BioCubaFarma.

Cross-border payment system stalled — Russian Finance Minister

Talks on establishing a cross-border payment system within BRICS are going at a crawl’s pace, as many seem happy with dollar payments, Russian Finance Minister Anton Siluanov said.

South African students shine on global stage 

DUT has once again demonstrated its growing global footprint with 13 of their students from the Faculty of Accounting and Informatics competing in the 2025 BRICS Vocational Skills China International Finals at Guangdong Construction Polytechnic in Guangdong, China.

India
Source: eoitashkent.gov.in

Embassy of India TashkentBrief on India-Uzbekistan Bilateral Relations
1. India and Uzbekistan have relations that go back to ancient history. India was one of the first countries to recognize the state sovereignty of Uzbekistan after the latter’s independence. The protocol on establishment of diplomatic relations between India and Uzbekistan was signed in Tashkent on 18 March 1992. India and Uzbekistan declared their Strategic Partnership in 2011. Several institutionalised mechanisms operate at both political and official levels under this partnership, to ensure regular interaction.

Leaders’ engagements

2. Prime Minister Shri Narendra Modi visited Uzbekistan in July 2015, June 2016 and in September 2022. President Shavkat Mirziyoyev visited India in October 2018 and in January 2019. A Virtual Summit between PM Modi and President Shavkat Mirziyoyev was held in December 2020. The Presidents of Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan attended the first India-Central Asia Summit on 27 January 2022 in a virtual format. President Shavkat Mirziyoyev and PM Modi met on the sidelines of the COP-28 in Dubai in December 2023 and also in October 2024 on the sidelines of BRICS Summit in Kazan. On August 12, 2025 the two leaders held a telephonic conversation and reviewed the strategic partnership developments. The leaders last met briefly in September, 2025 on the sidelines of the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO) summit in Tianjin, China.

Ministerial engagements

3. Both countries remain in touch at the Ministerial level as well. The Foreign Ministers of the two countries have met on the sidelines of India Central-Asia Dialogue, SCO meetings etc. Foreign Ministers’ last meeting was on the sidelines of the 4th India Central-Asia Dialogue in June 2024 in New Delhi. Defence Ministers and Speakers of Parliament have also met their counterparts.

4. The Finance Minister participated at the 9th Annual Meeting of the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank (AIIB) in Uzbekistan in September 2024. During her visit, she held meetings with President Mirziyoyev, Deputy Prime Minister and Minister of Investment and Foreign Trade, Mr. Jamshid Khodjayev, Deputy Prime Minister and Minister of Economy and Finance, Mr. Djamshid Kuchkarov, and Minister of Investments, Industry and Trade, Mr. Laziz Kudratov. She also took part in the Uzbekistan-India Business Forum, during which Bilateral Investment Treaty was signed on the sidelines.

5. A delegation led by Speaker of Lok Sabha Sh. Om Birla participated in the 150th Assembly of the Inter-Parliamentary Union (IPU) held in Tashkent in April 2025. During the visit, Speaker addressed the IPU Governing Council and Assembly, and called on President Shavkat Mirziyoyev. He also met with Uzbekistan Senate Chairperson Tanzila Narbayeva and Legislative Chamber Speaker Nuriddin Ismoilov, reaffirming India’s commitment to enhancing parliamentary ties.

6. Foreign Minister of the Republic of Uzbekistan Mr. Bakhtiyor Saidov visited India in June 2025 to participate in the 4th India – Central Asia Dialogue. During the visit, he held bilateral meeting with EAM. He, alongwith other Central Asian Foreign Ministers, also called on PM Shri Narendra Modi.
Inter-Governmental Commission

7. The 13th meeting of the Uzbek-India Intergovernmental Commission on Trade, Economic, Scientific and Technical Cooperation was held in New Delhi on 28 July 2022. The meeting was co-chaired by Minister of Commerce and Industry of India Shri Piyush Goyal and Deputy Prime Minister – Minister of Investment and Foreign Trade of Uzbekistan Mr. Jamshid Khodjaev. An agreement was also reached to hold a meeting of India-Central Asia Ministers of Transport in order to develop mechanisms for developing logistics infrastructure, a regional network of multimodal transport corridors, and increasing direct and transit cargo transportation as part of the North-South initiative.
Foreign Office Consultations (FoC)

8. The then Secretary (West) Shri Sanjay Verma visited Uzbekistan on August 8-9 August 2023 and held 16th Foreign Office Consultations with his counterpart Deputy Foreign Minister Bakhrom Aloyev. Secretary (West) also called on Foreign Minister Bakhtiyor Saidov. Earlier, Deputy Foreign Minister Mr. Furkat Sidikov led the Uzbek delegation to the bilateral Foreign Office Consultations held in New Delhi on 11 May 2022.

Bilateral Trade and Investments

9. India is among top 10 trade partners of Uzbekistan with bilateral trade of USD 980.4 million (as per Uzbek statistics-2024) which is well below potential. The major items of India’s exports are pharmaceutical products, mechanical equipment, vehicle parts, services, frozen buffalo meat, optical instruments and equipment and mobile phones. India’s import from Uzbekistan consists largely of fruit and vegetable products, services, fertilizers, juice products and extracts, and lubricants.

As per figures released by the Uzbek Ministry of Investment and Foreign Trade, Uzbekistan’s bilateral trades with India during the last five years were as follows:


10. Total Indian investments in Uzbekistan amount to US$ 451 million (approx). Indian investments by Indian companies include in pharmaceuticals, healthcare, education and residential building. There are four Indian Universities in Uzbekistan – Amity University in Tashkent, Sharda University in Andijan, Sambhram University in Jizzakh and Acharya University in Bukhara.

11. Development Partnership: India has carried out several projects under HICDP including setting up of an Allergological Center in Tashkent (INR 10,25,95,409), an IT lab at the Academy of Armed Forces of Uzbekistan (INR 8,48,60,376) and provisioning of computers for 125 ICT centers in schools in Syrdarya region (INR 6,74,77,580). The Embassy is also looking to renovate ANFA International Cricket stadium in Tashkent and continue development partnership projects in Karakalpakstan in healthcare and Solar Power projects to support agriculture in Kashkadarya region.

12. The 3rd meeting of the India–Uzbekistan Joint Working Group on Digital Technologies was held on virtual mode on November 7, 2025. Both sides discussed strengthening cooperation in IT, and advancing digital technologies in education, AI, cybersecurity, and other areas.

Defence & Security Cooperation

13. India has longstanding and wide-ranging cooperation with Uzbekistan in the field of defence. A Joint Working Group on defence was established in 2019 and the fourth JWG meeting was held in Uzbekistan in April 2024. India & Uzbekistan regularly participate in joint military exercises “DUSTLIK”, with the fifth edition held in April 2024 and attended by COAS General Manoj Pande during his visit to Uzbekistan. The sixth edition of exercise DUSTLIK was conducted in India in April 2025. There has been considerable interaction between Defence Industries of both nations with recent participation of a delegation from the Defence Industry Agency of Uzbekistan to Aero India 2025. The fifth Joint Working Group meeting on Defence cooperation was held in New Delhi on August 11, 2025. The ninth Joint Working Group meeting on Counter Terrorism was held in Tashkent on September 30, 2025.

14. The 3rd meeting of India–Central Asia NSAs/Secretaries of Security Councils was held on 16 October 2025 in Bishkek, attended by NSA Shri Ajit Doval. The meeting reviewed regional security challenges, advanced counterterrorism and tech cooperation, and continued the dialogue framework launched in 2022.

Education

15. Mission has set up India Study Centres under “Aid to Uzbekistan” in 15 universities of Uzbekistan and activated two short term ‘Chair’ by ICCR in Samarkand State University (Economics) and Tashkent State University of Oriental Studies (Hindi). Some Indian Study Centres also have IT instruments installed in them and equipped with books, musical instruments, Indian traditional dresses and artefacts. In January 2023, four Uzbek Hindi scholars attended World Hindi Conference in Nadi (Fiji). Prof. Nilufar Khodjaeva of Tashkent State University for Oriental Studies was awarded Hindi Samman Award by External Affairs Minister.

16. In 2024-2025, more than 100 candidates were selected from Uzbekistan under ITEC programmes.

Cultural Cooperation

17. There is close affinity between the cultures of the two countries. Indian films, actors and songs are extremely popular in Uzbekistan since the era of the Raj Kapoor. A 5-day Indian Cinema Week from 17 to 21 December 2024 was organized to commemorate the 100th birth anniversary of Raj Kapoor and a 4-day Film Festival was organized on the theme ‘Sashakt Nari – Celebrating Womanhood’ from March 13-16, 2025 showcasing women-centric films from Hindi and regional cinema.

18. The Lal Bahadur Shastri Centre for Indian Culture (LBSCIC) had approximately 384 yoga students and 250 Kathak students in 2024 attending classes. Yoga is immensely popular with more than 2000 participants attending International Yoga Day. Yoga Federation of Uzbekistan has an Indian Yoga Teacher and maintains close relationship with Indian Embassy. Two batches of Yoga Volunteers from Yoga Federation of Uzbekistan (YFU) have been certified by Ministry of Ayush to teach Yoga. The 7th International Conference on Yoga under the theme ‘Yoga for One Earth One Health’ was held in Tashkent in September 2025 with the participation of eminent Yoga experts from 10 Eurasian countries.

Diaspora & people-to-people ties

19. The size of the Indian community in Uzbekistan is estimated to be 18,500 which includes students (10,000) studying in different universities in Uzbekistan, workers (8000) and business professionals (500). First ever India-Uzbekistan Consular Dialogue was held in Tashkent on July 23, 2025 during which discussions were held on visa processes, consular cooperation, security matters concerning students, medical travellers and tourists in both countries. Details of visitors from India to Uzbekistan and vice versa during last two years are as follows:


Multilateral engagement

20. India and Uzbekistan cooperate closely at several multilateral platforms such as the UN, G20, BRICS & SCO. In St. Petersburg, on the sidelines of Xth BRICS Parliamentary Forum in July 2024, Senate Chairperson Tanzila Narbaeva held talks with Shri Om Birla, Speaker of Lok Sabha. Both sides also interact under the India-Central Asia framework in India-Central Asia Summit, India-Central Asia Dialogue at EAM level, Joint Working Group on Afghanistan and Central Asia Business Council. There is also India-Central Asia National Security Advisors’ meeting. Uzbekistan has also been actively participating in Voice of Global South Summit (VOGSS). In August 2024, in the third VOGSS, Uzbekistan participated in two Ministerial sessions on Trade (represented by H. E. Mr Gulamov Shokhrukh, Acting Deputy Minister of Investment, Industry and Trade) and Environment (represented by H. E. Mr. Jusipbek Kazbekov, Dy. Minister of Ecology, Environmental Protection). A delegation led by Speaker of Lok Sabha Sh. Om Birla participated in the 150th Assembly of the Inter-Parliamentary Union (IPU) held in Tashkent in April 2025.

21. India supports the Uzbekistan’s accession to the WTO with the caveat that accession process should not be used as a medium to bring in plurilateral issues into multilateral process of accession.

Russia
Source: mid.ru

Mr Ryzhenkov,

Mr Glazyev,

Colleagues,

Friends,

I am pleased to welcome you to Moscow for another joint meeting of the collegiums of the foreign ministries of Russia and Belarus.

Work in this format, which we maintain only with our Belarusian friends, speaks to the unprecedentedly high level of foreign policy coordination between Moscow and Minsk. Annual collegium meetings have a proven track record as an effective mechanism for developing common approaches to key international issues and synchronising our efforts on the global stage. They provide a good opportunity to strengthen professional contacts between the senior officials and experts from our two ministries, as well as simply to have a friendly unofficial discussion.

Today, we are looking back at the outgoing year, which marked the 80th anniversary of Victory in the Great Patriotic War, a sacred holiday for Belarusians and Russians. I would like to express my gratitude to our Belarusian allies for their consistently close cooperation and support in all our joint undertakings. Guided by the Programme of Coordinated Actions in Foreign Policy of the States Parties to the Treaty on the Establishment of the Union State for 2024-2026, we have closely cooperated within the framework of our common Eurasian associations, such as (in addition to the Union State) the CSTO, the EAEU, the CIS, and the SCO, as well as within BRICS, the UN, and the OSCE. In all of these organisations, we act in solidarity on virtually all international issues. We are implementing important joint initiatives, including those aimed at strengthening security and stability in Eurasia. Diplomatic support of large-scale bilateral cooperation and integration processes within the Union State has remained our overriding priority.
Undoubtedly, the Union State is a format that sets the tone for interaction across several areas. In accordance with the resolution adopted by the collegiums and instructions issued by the respective heads of state and government, we primarily focused on promoting cooperation within common integration entities, deepening ties among them, and expanding cooperation with the countries from the Global South. Likewise, we focused on coordinating our efforts on international legal issues, among them countering the West’s sanctions aggression, and other areas.

I believe we have tangible results to present to the people of our countries. Russia’s initiative to grant the SCO an observer status with the CIS has been implemented, and the CIS Plus format has been created. In September, secretaries general of the CSTO, the CIS, and the SCO signed a roadmap to promote trilateral cooperation drafted by the Russian side and a Joint Statement on the occasion of the 80th anniversary of the end of WWII and the foundation of the UN. The practice of cross-inviting heads of the executive bodies of the CSTO, the CIS, and the SCO to one other’s summits continued. I believe it would be useful to have the Permanent Committee of the Union State step up to this interaction as well, if the State Secretary of our Union, Mr Glazyev, who is here today, supports this idea.

We have facilitated the dialogue between the EAEU and the SCO and BRICS, and the coordination of 2026-2030 EEC-ASEAN Cooperation Programme. We have started looking into the possibility of expanding CIS contacts with African organisations and established cooperation between the CSTO Secretariat and the AU Counter Terrorism Centre.
As I mentioned earlier, we have jointly promoted on all international venues the initiative advanced by the President of the Republic of Belarus, Alexander Lukashenko, on the development of the Eurasian Charter of Diversity and Multipolarity in the 21st Century which aligns with the initiative put forward by President of the Russian Federation Vladimir Putin to form a new architecture of equal and indivisible security in Eurasia. We helped ensure the success of the 3rd Minsk International Conference on Eurasian Security in October. We are pleased to note the growing number of the countries that share our approaches and are willing to join this work.

The bilateral interstate Treaty on Security Guarantees within the Union State entered into force in March. Special representatives of Russia and Belarus - deputy foreign ministers Alexander Grushko and Igor Sekreta - began reviewing its implementation. On September 26, the first meeting of respective interagency delegations took place in Moscow. Overlapping assessments of the security situation in the Union State were noted.

The sector-specific departments of our respective ministries coordinated approaches to international legal cooperation priorities, which I mentioned earlier. Notably, the support in the UN General Assembly for the traditional resolution on the report by the International Criminal Court has significantly decreased. For the first time in all the years this resolution has been put to a vote, and fewer than half of UN member states voted in favour. In March, the presidents of Russia and Belarus signed a milestone bilateral Agreement on the Mutual Protection of Citizens from Unjustified Prosecution by Foreign States and International Judicial Bodies. A draft directive of the Supreme State Council of the Union State on mutual support and cooperation in the field of international justice has been drafted and submitted for consideration. In conjunction with our Belarusian friends, we are promoting the Declaration on Enhancing the Role of International Law and guiding principles on qualifying unilateral coercive measures as unlawful, which was signed at the previous meeting of the collegiums. In May, our permanent representatives circulated it in the UN Security Council and the General Assembly.

We have made significant efforts to expand international support for countering the practice of illegal unilateral sanctions. On the initiative of the Group of Friends in Defence of the UN Charter, of which Russia and Belarus are members and play an important role, the UN General Assembly adopted, in June, a resolution establishing the International Day against Unilateral Coercive Measures. It will be observed on December 4. We ensured the inclusion in the final document of the 16th UNCTAD ministerial session of provisions on the negative impact of unilateral sanctions on world trade. I’m aware that many in this audience took part in this work. Thank you all.

The agenda of today’s meeting is quite extensive. We will begin by discussing issues related to the joint use of humanitarian policy tools, the promotion of traditional values, and the preservation of historical memory. We will then consider matters related to cooperation with friendly states and their associations, as well as our approaches to building relations with the countries whose governments pursue an openly unfriendly policy towards us. This will also include our relations with the organisations that deviate from their own founding principles, do not adhere to impartiality and equal distance, but instead seek to take predominantly pro-Western political positions.
We will place special emphasis on sharing experience in foreign policy information support. Following the meeting, we plan to sign a Resolution of the collegiums and a Plan for inter-ministerial consultations for 2026.

Russia
Source: mid.ru

2025 BRICS+ Counter-Terrorism Conference in Moscow
 
On December 3-4, Moscow will host the 2025 BRICS+ Counter-Terrorism Conference: National and Regional Counter-Terrorism Strategies Amid Emerging Security Challenges and Threats.

The conference will take place under the aegis of the Russian Foreign Ministry, coinciding with the 5th anniversary of the BRICS counter-terrorism strategy adopted at Russia’s initiative while the country chaired the association in 2020. The document laid a solid foundation for an extensive interaction of the BRICS countries to raise their counter-terrorism protection.

The forum will bring together over 100 delegates from the BRICS member and partner countries. The guests will include representatives of specialised government agencies, academic circles, and civil society. In addition, high-ranking colleagues from the UN Office of Counter-Terrorism, the SCO Regional Anti-Terrorist Structure, the CIS Anti-Terrorism Centre, and the CSTO Secretariat will take part in the forum. Experts from the Monitoring Group of the UN Security Council 1267/1989/2253 committee on ISIS and Al-Qaeda sanctions and 1988 committee on Taliban sanctions will also join the discussions.

The conference will serve as a unique platform for a discussion and non-politicised exchange of views on a wide range of pressing issues on the counter-terrorist agenda. Specifically, there are plans to pay particular attention to a variety of aspects of developing progressive theoretical and methodological approaches to opposing terrorism and raising the efficiency of the joint work to curb the financial and economic support for terrorist activities. The participants will also exchange their assessments of the existing terrorist and extremist threats at the regional and global levels, and share advanced practices in fighting dissemination of destructive ideologies, including on the Internet.

A round table to discuss the experience of international organisations in working out collective principles and regional strategies of countering terrorism will be the core event of the forum. Its participants will focus on various initiatives and projects aimed at improving cooperation in neutralising contemporary challenges and threats.

We regard the upcoming conference as Russia’s contribution to the implementation of the BRICS Counter-Terrorism Strategy (2020), the BRICS Counter-Terrorism Action Plan (2021), and the BRICS Counter-Terrorism Working Group Position Paper (2024).

We are confident that the conference will give an additional impetus to developing a multifaceted dialogue on combatting terrorism in the BRICS format and underline the crucial role played by our country, its partners and colleagues in the forum in the global efforts to ensure international peace and security.

Russia
Source: brics-plus-analytics.org

On BRICS strategic complementarity

Since its inception the BRICS as a bloc has been criticized for bringing together economies that are too diverse, too different and heterogeneous to pursue common approaches to policy. This criticism has been leveled in particular with respect to the China-India duo, that was seen as a source of contradictions due to either cultural differences or geopolitical orientation. In reality the two Asian giants managed to coordinate numerous joint BRICS initiatives, including the creation of the New Development Bank and more recently the bloc’s expansion in membership on the back of earlier BRICS+ meetings. There may be perhaps ways to render this joint coordination more systematic with one of the possible paradigms in this area being the well-known principle of “strategic complementarity”. We proceed to explore the possible modalities of this principle in streamlining and facilitating greater coordination among BRICS core members.

In economics and in game theory, “strategic complementarity” takes place when a player’s optimal strategy increases along with the increase in other players’ strategies, providing for a mutual reinforcement of the parties’ strategies[1]. Examples of such complementarities may range from network effects in platforms to spending on public goods and R&D in the presence of positive spillover effects[2]. Experimental studies on the relative merits of strategic complementarity vs. strategic substitutability in game theoretic settings reveal that “there is significantly more cooperation when actions exhibit strategic complementarities than in case of strategic substitutes“[3]. The multiple equilibria associated with a “strategic complementarity” setting may enhance the optionality of scenarios for the coordinating parties, something that may be of significant value in settings that have frequently been characterized by limited optionality for emerging market economies in the past.

With respect to BRICS, the operation of the strategic complementarity principle needs to go beyond the narrow spirit of short-term game theory, to a broader type of cooperation that is systemic, forward-looking and multi-faceted. It should seek to exploit the differences in economic specialization, market positioning, regional and global market presence, but also the differences in values, culture and geopolitical orientation. Such a strategic complementarity orientation has the potential to increase not only the economic prowess of the bloc, but also its soft power via appealing to the widest possible segments of the global community.

In this sense, the operation of the strategic complementarity principle within BRICS may to some degree be compared to the principle of additionality in impact investing. In the latter case impact investors aim to direct their financial resources into areas that have hitherto not been adequately covered by other investors. This effort to find new areas that have not been attended to in earlier investment rounds raises the potential for delivering a more emphatic impact (diminishing returns likely prevalent in more “saturated” segments), whether in the social or in the environmental sphere.

In the case of the strategic complementarity between China and India in BRICS the following areas of coordination could be explored:

• Policy impulses and initiatives: while China’s approach on issues of BRICS cooperation has frequently been more focused on top-down initiatives and proposals (BRICS+ initiative being one such example), in India’s case these tended to be more bottom-up, emphasizing the need to improve the micro-level conditions for entrepreneurship, start-ups and business activity. 
• Trade alliances: while China’s trade alliances such as RCEP are focused on Southeast Asia and the Pacific, India has its regional integration initiatives positioned in South Asia and bilateral alliances forged across developed and emerging economies across the globe.
• Transportation corridors: while China actively builds the East-West transportation corridors in Eurasia as part of the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI), India focusses more on other pathways to connectivity, including via North-South corridors. A co-integration between these transportation projects/networks would greatly improve the optionality of transportation routes in Eurasia, though this would require significantly more coordination between the two economies. 
• Complementary nature of economic specialization and trade patterns in global markets: China specializing in manufacturing and capital-intensive goods, with India being more present in segments such as raw materials, intermediate goods, pharma and services.

Admittedly, the above spheres of coordination may call for a far greater degree of cohesion between these two BRICS members – something that skeptics may see as a tall order in the current international setting. At the same time, such coordination if advanced could result in substantial welfare gains not only for China and India, but likely for the broader Global South. In the extreme case of a firm alliance exploiting the opportunities of strategic complementarity, the two economies could substantially strengthen their position on the international stage to the point where they become dominant not only in a developing world setting, but also globally.  

At the same time, alongside opportunities there may also be risks and costs associated with the “strategic complementarity” paradigm. The use of the game-theoretic lens for BRICS cooperation may limit the weight of the broader humanistic and humanitarian issues that are so critical for the bloc’s global role. Such a paradigm may also be difficult to implement and coordinate in a setting characterized by mounting geopolitical risks and expanding membership in the bloc’s core and the partnership belt. 

In the end, the “strategic complementarity” principle should not be confined to the China-India pair, but needs to be seen as an operational guide for the broader BRICS+ formation. With cultural differences and divergence in national economic models becoming even more pronounced after the bloc’s expansion, “strategic complementarity” may serve to turn such differences into a key strength, rather than a weakness. Such a principle may also focus the priorities of BRICS members away from short-term considerations to longer-term win-win outcomes and cooperation pathways in which policy initiatives coming from various members reinforce each other. Strategic complementarity may also become an important feature of the annual succession in the presidencies of BRICS countries, whereby the bloc’s development priorities and undertakings are reinforced through complementary initiatives of the subsequent BRICS presidencies.

[1] Tirole, J. The Theory of Industrial Organization. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press (1998)
[2] https://www.kellogg.northwestern.edu/research/math/papers/1336.PDF
https://www.researchgate.net/publication/326279453_Cooperation_and_Strategic_Complementarity_An_Experiment_with_Two_Voluntary_Contribution_Mechanism_Games_with_Interior_Equilibria
[3] https://repository.tilburguniversity.edu/server/api/core/bitstreams/d5f6ed6d-1f93-4646-b4b2-6cdd37c05ad4/content

Yaroslav Lissovolik, Founder, BRICS+ Analytics

Russia
Source: brics-plus-analytics.org

Digital economic agreements advance in 2025

One of the questions frequently discussed this year by economists has been the surprising resilience of global economic growth and trade dynamics to the unprecedented shocks of rising protectionism and unilateralism in the world economy. With respect to economic growth performance, Gita Gopinath, the former IMF’s Chief economist, outlined a number of factors, including the AI investment boom, wealth increases driving consumption (also thanks to AI), and government spending being more generous[1]. In our view, global trade benefited from these factors supporting economic activity as well as a number of other developments, including the rising role of digital economic agreements (DEAs) and digital trade. Indeed, this year witnessed important milestones in digital economic diplomacy that are likely to deliver important impulses to economic openness in the coming years.

Among the advanced economies, Singapore is a clear leader in advancing the propagation of digital economic agreements across the world economy. It has concluded digital economic agreements with partners such as Australia, the UK and Korea, while also championing regional digital initiatives within ASEAN[2]. In 2025 Singapore continued to push the digital economic agenda forward concluding talks with some of the key regional blocs on the launching of digital economic agreements. In particular, in September 2025 Singapore signed a DEA accord with EFTA. According to the EFTA official website, the DEA “builds on the EFTA–Singapore Free Trade Agreement, which entered into force in 2003”, with the digital accord establishing “clear and predictable rules for digital trade between the EFTA States and Singapore” [3].

Earlier in mid-2025 Singapore signed a digital trade accord (DTA) with the EU. According to the EU press release, the agreement (that is yet to be ratified) “will enhance consumer protection, facilitate trusted cross-border data flows and provide legal certainty for businesses that want to engage in cross-border digital trade, as well as addressing unjustified barriers to digital trade[4]… The DTA will prevent protectionist practices and policies by prohibiting unjustified data localisation measures… [serving] to ensure trusted cross-border data flows and the protection of source code against unauthorised disclosure[5].

With Singapore being an uncontested leader in the advancement of digital economic agreements across countries, ASEAN is in pole position in the digital race among the regional blocs. In October 2025 ASEAN reached a crucial milestone in its digital development by announcing the substantial conclusion of talks on an ASEAN Digital Economy Framework Agreement (DEFA). This digital accord is expected to be signed in 2026 with ASEAN’s digital economy expected to reach USD 2 trillion by 2030 on the back of the agreement’s implementation[6]. Among its key areas, the ASEAN DEFA seeks to advance digital economic cooperation in digital payments, data privacy and cross-border data transfer[7], with this ASEAN regional framework potentially providing pathways to similar regional accords in the digital sphere to be pursued by other regional blocs[8]. ASEAN has also committed to implementing digital rules under e-commerce Chapters of ASEAN-plus agreements that include the Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership (RCEP) and the recently upgraded ASEAN-Australia-New Zealand FTA (AANZFTA)[9].

Beyond the EU-EFTA-ASEAN triangle, digital cooperation expanded in other regional integration arrangements as more regional blocs strive to enter into the top league of digital development. One of the cases in point is the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC)[10] that concluded an agreement with the Digital Cooperation Organization (DCO) in 2025[11], while in mid-2025 the UAE, one of the digital leaders in the GCC bloc, launched its Digital Economic Partnership Agreement (DEPA)[12] accession process[13]. In November 2025 during the Second Meeting between the Committee of Permanent Representatives to ASEAN (CPR) and the GCC Ambassadors’ Council in Jakarta, the two regional blocs singled out the digital economy as one of the key/priority areas of mutual economic cooperation[14].

In our previous publications, we have highlighted the possibility of OASES economies (Oriental Republic of Uruguay, Austria, Switzerland, Emirates (UAE) and Singapore) and their respective regional integration arrangements building a network of trade and digital alliances, with the digital agreements concluded in 2025 providing further momentum to the emergence of these platforms[15][16]. Such networks of digital economic/trade accords may in turn serve to further multilateralize digital and trade treaties at the level of regional blocs, with DEA accords expanding the coverage of FTA agreements to the sphere of digital economy. This in turn may lead to the emergence of mega-regional formations in the sphere of trade and digital cooperation, whose weight could potentially impact the evolution of global agreements, particularly in areas where multilateral coordination through global organizations is either absent or weak.

For BRICS economies, the developments in DEA accords in 2025 point to the need to prioritize digital economic agreements within the BRICS+ network in the coming years, with a particular emphasis being placed on exploring the potential modalities of building regional DEAs as well as “RTA-to-RTA” digital economic accords. With ASEAN leading the current upward momentum in the development of such digital agreements and with greater cooperation between BRICS and ASEAN throughout 2025[17], the coming years could present a unique opportunity for BRICS+ to narrow the “digital gap” for the economies of the Global South.

[1] https://www.linkedin.com/feed/update/urn:li:activity:7400562205710241792/
[2] https://www.mti.gov.sg/trade-international-economic-relations/agreements/digital-economy-agreements-dea/
[3] https://www.efta.int/media-resources/news/efta-and-singapore-sign-digital-economy-agreement-joint-communique
[4] According to the press release, this includes “the protection of privacy and personal data, customs duties on electronic transmissions, electronic contracts, electronic authentication and trust services, online consumer trust, unsolicited direct marketing communications, open government data, and regulatory cooperation on digital trade”.
[5] https://ec.europa.eu/commission/presscorner/detail/en/ip_25_1152
[6] https://www.weforum.org/stories/2025/10/asean-defa-digital-economy-pact-negotiations/
[7] https://asean.org/asean-economic-community-council-statement-on-the-substantial-conclusion-of-the-asean-defa-negotiations/
[8] https://brics-plus-analytics.org/asean-summit-expands-pathways-to-economic-cooperation/
[9] https://www.mti.gov.sg/trade-international-economic-relations/regional-and-international-platforms/association-of-southeast-asian-nations-asean/asean-digital-integration/
[10] https://www.elibrary.imf.org/view/journals/087/2025/003/article-A001-en.xml
[11] https://gulfnews.com/business/analysis/digital-plans-in-gcc-shift-from-talk-to-action-in-new-pact-1.500271779
[12] DEPA was launched in 2020 by Chile, New Zealand, and Singapore and created a framework for digital trade cooperation with the aim of lowering barriers in the digital economy
[13] https://neweconomy.expert/news/259427/
[14] https://asean.org/asean-the-cooperation-council-for-the-arab-states-of-the-gulf-reaffirm-commitment-to-enhance-relations/
[15] https://brics-plus-analytics.org/scenarios-for-mega-regional-agreements/
[16] https://www.researchgate.net/publication/394452058_OASES_as_an_International_Platform_for_Economic_Cooperation
[17] https://brics-plus-analytics.org/indonesia-becomes-a-full-fledged-brics-member/
https://brics-plus-analytics.org/assessing-the-potential-of-the-brics-partnership-circle/

South Africa
Source: iol.co.za

New treatment offers rapid, low-risk therapy for iron deficiency anaemia, attracting global attention.

When Kazakhstan quietly achieved the World Health Organisation’s goal of reducing premature mortality from non-communicable diseases by 25%, as the first Central Asian nation to do so, global headlines have been quiet. One can only wonder if this is because this milestone signals something larger than public health success. It represents the broader structural shift of the industrialisation of healthcare in the Global South as a foundation for economic sovereignty.

Development in the Global South has mostly been built around aid, imported solutions, and dependency on multinational supply chains. Imagining a Global South where industrialisation emerges from within is a new phenomenon that the west is still trying to understand and weigh the consequences of. Kazakhstan’s model of combining a network of 85 stroke centres, digitised emergency medical services, and state-driven R&D partnerships, is less about catching up to the West and more about building independent systems of production and capability, which is inherently not something we will Western media celebrate.

From Consumption to Capability

What sets Kazakhstan apart is not just that it met a WHO benchmark, but how it did so. The country’s health transformation was achieved through a deliberate industrial strategy of investing in medical technology, expanding manufacturing capacity for health products, and building local expertise. 
In the 1990s, Kazakhstan’s health system was highly centralised and underfunded, relying on imports for everything from diagnostics to pharmaceuticals. Today, its model reflects a regional movement, trickling over into other countries.

Iran has developed an injectable nano iron supplement, the first of its kind and Russia now has a full-cycle human papillomavirus (HPV) vaccine. The localisation of science and production as the backbone of sovereign development is now beginning to become a pattern in the Global South.
This kind of progress is often overlooked because it doesn’t fit the old narrative of industrialisation as heavy industry or export-led growth, but in the 21st century, the ability to build health technologies domestically is as strategically important as manufacturing cars or steel. It’s the infrastructure of human development and it signals that parts of the Global South are moving from being consumers of medical innovation to producers of it.

A Shift in Development Power

The significance of these advances extends beyond national borders. When a country like Kazakhstan builds internal capacity to tackle chronic diseases, it reduces dependency on imported pharmaceuticals and international aid. This independence, in turn, frees up fiscal space, strengthens domestic industries, and creates export potential in healthcare services and biotechnologies.

For example, Russia’s HPV vaccine production line in Kirov is expected to meet domestic demand by 2027, but it also creates regional supply opportunities, particularly for BRICS+ and Eurasian partners. Similarly, Iran’s new nano-iron formulation addresses local anaemia challenges but could serve as a cost-effective solution for Africa, where iron deficiency remains a leading cause of maternal health complications.

These are not isolated stories. They form part of reordering of development power. The Global South is no longer waiting for Western pharmaceutical giants to transfer technology, it is building its own. This, in turn, reshapes the global aid and trade architecture, with countries exchanging knowledge and products horizontally rather than vertically.

Lessons for the Future of Southern Development

The lesson here is that industrialisation in the Global South must now be measured by the ability to create self-sustaining systems, particularly in health, food, and technology. Kazakhstan’s success was not a miracle of GDP growth but of policy consistency, institutional investment, and public-private coordination. It shows that development can be both industrial and inclusive when states treat health not as social expenditure, but as a productive sector.

The global development community should take note. The next wave of industrialisation will not come from building factories for export; it will come from building capacities that keep societies functional and independent.

For African and BRICS-aligned economies, the path forward lies in this same model of local innovation, regional cooperation, and investment in knowledge-based production. 

Russia
Source: mid.ru

Question: If France wants to join BRICS, will BRICS accept France?

Sergey Lavrov: President of France Emmanuel Macron has already said somewhere that he intends to participate in BRICS. However, no one has extended an invitation to him.

I do not believe there is a consensus within BRICS, nor even a majority, that would welcome France given its current positions in the global economy, politics, and finance. In my view, France’s natural place remains within NATO and the European Union, which today are hardly distinguishable from one another; and, obviously, within the G7, which is losing relevance…

Incidentally, the G7 foreign ministers recently met in Canada, which currently holds the presidency. They adopted a statement asserting their uncompromising commitment to the principles of free markets and fair competition, ensuring that no one abuses their position in the global economy and that free-market rules are observed.

The impetus for this lofty and in fact reasonable declaration was the situation with Chinese rare-earth metals, which China began to limit on the market in response to unilateral US and EU sanctions. Swift calls for “fairness,” “free markets,” and so on followed. This is a case of self-exposure.

A closer look at how Western countries actually interpret the norms and rules of the free market and the principles of globalisation, which they once promoted as the ideal model of economic interdependence, shows that when they seek to punish someone, whether Russia, Iran, or Venezuela, they demonstrate hypocrisy, double standards, an inability to negotiate, and dishonesty. Unfortunately, these traits are now openly visible in the actions of our Western partners.

Question: Will Russia accept French businesses back?

Sergey Lavrov: A significant number of French businesses continue operating in Russia. I hope I am not revealing anything confidential when I say that I sometimes meet with their representatives at their request. They are primarily interested in the conditions under which they continue to work here. They also maintain dialogue with Russia’s Ministry of Economic Development and the Ministry of Finance. We have no intention of expelling or restricting the rights of those who have remained.

When members of the French business association meet with me, they are also interested in international political trends. These are people who, I believe, act in good faith. They have invested in Russia, want their investments to function, and are prepared to shoulder political risks imposed by their Russophobic governments.

This applies not only to the French. German companies and businesses from other European and EU countries also remain here. According to our statistics, more foreign companies have stayed in Russia than have left. And those who departed left their market niches free. Some closed their operations in various ways. President Vladimir Putin has spoken about this more than once. He said that those who left and would later decide to return may find their former niches already occupied, and those who replaced them are now our priority. During challenging times, they placed business interests above politics. Incidentally, I have recently seen reports on social media of several companies re-registering their trademarks and brand names in Russia.

Russia
Source: mid.ru

Dear colleagues, distinguished guests and participants, good morning!

It is my great pleasure and honour to be invited to compare notes about BRICS at this meeting of the Valdai Discussion Club – a highly respected platform for open, constructive and thoughtful dialogue.

First and foremost, I’d like to underscore our deep gratitude for the insightful contributions of the academic society, in particular expert community, in providing analytical support to the BRICS agenda and, of course, to advancing Russia’s foreign policy in general. For us, a steady stream of fresh ideas and new innovative perspectives remains essential.

All that said, in view of the theme of today’s discussion – “BRICS today – a plateau or a new rising?” – I have to say that I’ve been tempted to add a note of doubt on this choice of words.

Lately we’ve been witnessing a rising tide of criticism coming primarily from the western quarters about shyness, slowness and ineffectiveness of BRICS, even not rising to the occasion to respond to the current global challenges, direct negative outbursts coming from its opponents and some high quarters. The notion of “BRICS on a plateau today” reminded me of such allegations.

I have to stress, that there could be nothing further from the truth.

Next year, BRICS will celebrate its twentieth anniversary. Since 2006, the grouping has gone through an impressive evolution. By 2025, BRICS has more than doubled in size, if we count partners – even quadrupled, transforming into a mature strategic partnership of like-minded nations united by a shared vision.

BRICS was initially formed as an association of states belonging to different, even civilizational, systems, representing different continents and cultures. Accordingly, each BRICS member has significant national identity, its own vision – both of its role in the grouping and of its direction and development. But more importantly, BRICS is firmly rooted in the principles of genuine equality, openness, and mutual respect. Without these, BRICS simply would not exist. And this is precisely where a very productive balance between national distinctiveness and a shared commitment to this particular model of cooperation manifests itself.

From this perspective, BRICS is, of course, in many ways a pioneering international phenomenon. BRICS has evolved since its inception – even underwent several stages of qualitative transformation. What began as an informal dialogue platform has become now a complex and multifaceted mechanism for interstate cooperation on an equal footing across a wide range of areas. Today we have a fairly well-developed self-sustaining mechanism for financial, trade, and economic cooperation. I’d say we have now in BRICS around 40 or more dedicated work-streams. Interaction occurs through relevant government agencies and business communities of the states. Over the years, our grouping has also become a recognized and influential actor on the global stage that plays substantive role in shaping the international agenda. At the annual summits joint decisions are adopted and developed that reflect the shared approaches of participating states to many key issues on the global and regional agendas.

Expanding over the years agenda is a natural process. The world isn’t getting simpler, and as we accumulate experience in our own multilateral cooperation, it’s only natural that BRICS is formalizing and announcing its approaches. The latest BRICS Summit in Rio reaffirmed our joint commitment to further strengthening political coordination to facilitate the emergence of a new democratic, polycentric world order, where the interests of the World’s Majority, Global South and East countries will be duly taken into account. We believe BRICS will continue to serve as a driving force for positive global change. The potential here is enormous, and it is only just beginning to be realized. And of course it reinforces, helps us further to act in concert in other venues – beyond BRICS. The UN, G-20, you name it.

And that’s precisely why it attracts so much attention: many countries across the Global South and East are curious to understand, how the BRICS modus operandi would work for their benefit while preserving their national identity. And it is obvious that what draws them to BRICS is far from only its combined economic weight (which is considerable and growing – BRICS amounts already a combined GDP, measured by purchasing power parity, of around 40% of global GDP, a quarter of international trade, and nearly half of the world’s population; BRICS states are major exporters and consumers of energy resources, comprise one-third of the world’s irrigated fertile land and more than 40% of global agricultural output), but beyond all that by its distinct culture of dialogue – a culture built on sovereign equality, respect for each nation’s development path, inclusiveness, and a genuine commitment improving the well-being of its peoples. And all decisions within BRICS are made solely by consensus – and this is one of the key guarantees that the national interests of each state are protected and ensured. At the same time it has a unifying effects and constitutes the foundation of the grouping strength. This is a true common denominator. Not the lowest common denominator, as some would try to describe it, but the greatest common denominator, in terms of how the positions of different countries, when formulated collectively, acquire additional weight and leverage in other international multilateral fora.

BRICS since its inception is based on three pillars of cooperation – policy and security, economics and finance, and humanitarian contacts – which year by year are filled with practical initiatives and, in a political sense, reflect common views on global processes, security, development, economic and financial, environment and health challenges, which BRICS does not shy away from. BRICS continues to develop in line with its stated goals and with a focus on addressing practical issues. If one looks at the lengthy leaders summit declarations, their operational sections, for example, adopted in Kazan in 2024 and in Rio de Janeiro in 2025 – it’s clear what has been done and what will be done next. Such leaders’ documents could or should be called action plans since they are, by and large, not just statements of intent, but de facto roadmaps for practical work, real action. Here, we all in BRICS have much to be proud of and – of course – room for further improvement.

One might add here that the World Majority sees clearly the stark difference between BRICS and some other groupings. To illustrate this let me quote as an example the description of G-7 in a recent Foreign Affairs article: “a U.S.-led group of economically advanced countries that, in the interest of promoting their common purpose and values, willingly sacrifice a significant degree of strategic autonomy”. I will not dwell on this assessment – G-7 is «not my cup of tea» – but from my already long experience within BRICS I can assure you with absolute certainty that such words could never be applied to BRICS.

Our opponents’ increased attention to BRICS is understandable. The grouping has transformed into a real force to be reckoned with. It has become an integral component of the new, changing world order. That article in Foreign Affairs also vividly shows that our Western vis-à-vis try to measure BRICS by their own yardstick, seeing our grouping only through the confrontation lens – how it might or not be able to oppose, withstand the western politics or, let’s say, the current world trade and tariffs policies. They are accustomed to thinking within their own paradigm – the logic of bloc thinking, which boils down to the formula: “Whoever is not with us is against us”. This mindset has not only become ingrained; it has become an absolutely inescapable part of the mentality of politicians and policy-making circles in the collective West. Hence the suspicion, hence the desire to find ways to weaken BRICS and hinder its further development.

What they fail to see is that BRICS is not a geopolitical bloc directed against anyone. It is not “anti-West”, but is genuinely “non-West” – a positive and inclusive platform. Our own open and broad-based agenda, grounded in constructive dialogue and cooperation, not confrontation, appears unsettling for them. Let us be frank: no Western country has or will ever join BRICS. The reason is clear. The so-called «golden billion», or the privileged «garden» minority of advanced economies if you wish – continues to resist multipolarity, striving to preserve the comfort of unipolarity and through this its historical dominance. What BRICS is accused of is merely a reflection of a policy aimed at weakening geopolitical competitors. And this will continue to happen. And BRICS, no doubt, will continue to resist it.

Those who are moving closer to BRICS see the persistence with which our vis-à-vis are trying to undermine it. Nevertheless, the tectonic shifts under way in global politics are irreversible. The desire for cooperation in this format remains strong. Self-respecting countries, politicians who prioritize their national interests over pleasing some guy in some capital, are making a conscious choice in favor of rapprochement.

BRICS on its part is developing steadily interaction with the World Majority, enhancing consistently dialogue with all those who are willing to engage in a good will. Here I’d like to quote President Vladimir Putin, who said at the plenary session of the Valdai Discussion Club: “We are not pursuing a policy against anyone. The entire BRICS policy is aimed at ourselves, at the members of this grouping”. BRICS countries are not proposing an «alternative world», but advocate building better foundations, conditions for integration and sustainable growth amid today’s challenging international environment.

The increasing interest in BRICS is not accidental – it reflects a deep global demand for more inclusive, equal and representative cooperation, for a platform to voice and defend the priorities, core interests and concerns of the Global South and East. In an era of uncertainty, many states look to BRICS as a source of resilience and stability.

This momentum naturally led to the expansion of BRICS membership and the creation of the BRICS Partner Country category. On 1 January 2024 Egypt, Iran, the UAE and Ethiopia joined as full members, followed by Indonesia this year. Saudi Arabia joined also this process. In 2025 the decision to create a category of partner countries was adopted in Kazan – one of the significant achievements of the Russian 2024 Chairship. Currently, ten countries became BRICS partners: Belarus, Bolivia, Vietnam, Kazakhstan, Cuba, Malaysia, Nigeria, Thailand, Uganda, and Uzbekistan.

Generally, there is a common understanding within BRICS that the doors of the group must remain open to interaction with countries of the Global South and East that share the BRICS values. At the same time currently there are no expectations of immediate steps in this direction. Today the primary focus is on the consolidation of the expanded BRICS, of its vast constellation of cooperation mechanisms.

As President Vladimir Putin noted at the Valdai Discussion Club on 2 October 2025, BRICS is expanding rapidly – and «this growth is both good and challenging». The more participants the group brings on board, the heavier the BRICS ship becomes in terms of the interests and opinions. Yet coordination and dialog remain the only path forward, and BRICS has shown that it is capable of finding common ground and moving collectively, navigating through turbulent waters of the current international environment.

And world interest in BRICS continues to grow. We observe it at the traditional “Outreach” and “BRICS+” summit sessions where the speakers and those invited to these events demonstrate a desire not only to better understand the opportunities BRICS offers them, but also to make an intellectual and practical contribution to this work. This has been particularly noticeable in recent years. Both during the South African Chairship in 2023, and during Summit in Kazan a year ago, and in Rio de Janeiro this past July, nearly three dozen countries from the Global South and East participated in each of these events. Furthermore, the heads of the executive bodies of the UN, WHO, WTO, and multilateral development banks also participated. We welcome this.

These major global events testify vividly as well, by the way, that BRICS has no hidden agenda. As you well can imagine: if anything anti-Western were being hatched in these formats, if any schemes were being hatched, if the threads of a conspiracy were being woven to undermine Western structures, it would be known and visible. This is clear not only to those directly involved in it but also to invited states and any unbiased observer.

Although BRICS is relatively new, experience has already been accumulating. Building on the decisions of previous summits each Chairship provides undoubtedly well-thought-out contributions to its agenda, laying the grounds for the further progress of grouping. All its members also contribute constructively to this work in one way or another. BRICS remains guided not by ideology, but by mutual interests, sovereign equality, and beneficial cooperation. This message was reaffirmed in the Declaration of the XVI BRICS Summit in Kazan on 22-24 October 2024, where leaders supported strengthening multilateralism through «the emergence of new centres of power, policy decision-making and economic growth, which can pave the way for a more equitable, just, democratic and balanced multipolar world order». The XVII BRICS Summit in Rio de Janeiro on 6-7 July 2025, alongside the extraordinary leaders’ online-meeting on 8 September 2025 focused on the global economy and multilateral trade, further reaffirmed BRICS as one of key centers of global influence – a voice defending the core interests of the Global South and East.

No one can predict exactly what BRICS will look like in ten or thirty years. Much will depend on the evolution of the international system itself. But BRICS emerged as one of the pillars of a world order rooted not in the dominance of the power, but in international law and sovereign equality.

Let me reiterate, addressing the central question of today’s discussion: there is no sign of a growth plateau or stagnation within BRICS. Despite the diversity of political systems, cultural and civilizational backgrounds among its member states, nobody brings negative agendas into the group. On the contrary, all its members remain committed to constructive engagement, mutual respect and further cooperation, ensuring that the BRICS platform remains forward-looking and inclusive. One could also notice that expectations surrounding BRICS are set sometimes unrealistically high. In practice, work all across relevant pillars moves forward in a step-by-step manner, in full respect of national legislations and interests, as well as priorities and political will of our member states. In other words, we are not in the business of manufacturing decorative formats for the sake of publicity or artificial timelines.

The end of the very productive and successful Brazilian BRICS Chairship is approaching, – and we wholeheartedly congratulate our friends and colleagues in Brasilia, – and, accordingly, the moment when our Indian colleagues will share with other members of the grouping their plans for their 2026 BRICS Chairship. Our Indian friends have traditionally shown great interest and devoted significant attention to working within the BRICS format. This has always been the case: India is a founding member of the grouping. Now that BRICS has expanded, it is a ship that the Indian captain, we are confident, will steer next year on a steady, firm course toward further deepening our multifaceted cooperation. As has happened in the past, during previous India’s Chairships, they will add momentum and initiatives in each area of the vast BRICS partnership. Moreover, they will do so thoughtfully, with their own national specifics, which we respect and will strive to fully support. We'll see what results BRICS achieves by the end of next year, but I’m confident that under India’s leadership, cooperation within the grouping, with BRICS partner countries and with other like-minded states will significantly advance.

Thank you.

Brazil
Source: brics.br

The document was prepared by the Secretariat and the National Youth Council of Brazil. Among its highlights is the new Multilateral Memorandum of Understanding (MoU)

Brazil’s National Youth Secretariat (SNJ), which is part of the General Secretariat of the Presidency of the Republic, and National Youth Council (CONJUVE) have concluded the report of the 11th BRICS Youth Summit. The document compiles the Summit’s main results and debates, organized by thematic axes. It also outlines proposals for joint action and presents the new institutional framework for cooperation on youth policies among member countries and partners of the bloc.

The concluding meeting of the youth delegation’s work reaffirmed the Brazilian BRICS Presidency’s commitment to strengthening multilateralism, inclusion, and social justice. It also underscored the group’s commitment to building a sustainable, multipolar world grounded in the social participation of young people. The meeting was held in Brasília in June 2025.

Guided by the motto Strengthening Global South Cooperation for More Inclusive and Sustainable Governance, the meeting established itself as one of the world’s leading youth cooperation platforms. It brought together official representatives from nine BRICS member countries (Brazil, China, Egypt, India, Indonesia, Iran, Russia, South Africa, and the United Arab Emirates), as well as partner countries such as Belarus, Bolivia, Cuba, Malaysia, and Nigeria.

Several meetings preceded the Summit, including regional seminars that brought together more than 2,000 young people and promoted social participation and youth engagement in diverse contexts. From among the participants, five young people—one from each region—were elected to join the Summit.

Results

One of the main deliverables of the Brazilian Presidency for the youth agenda was the signing, among the signatory countries, of a new Multilateral Memorandum of Understanding (MoU). The agreement seeks to strengthen governance instruments and consolidate an expanded cooperation platform focused on enhancing youth public policies, including social inclusion, innovation, exchange, sustainability, and democratic governance.

The MoU is formalized ten years after the establishment of the BRICS youth agenda at the Sixth Leaders’ Summit, held in Fortaleza (Brazil, 2014), and also ten years after the signing of the first memorandum on the subject at the 2015 ministerial meeting in Kazan (Russia). The new governance structure proposed in the Memorandum includes the institutionalization of the Biennial Ministerial Meeting, the Annual Technical Meeting, and the creation of the Executive Coordination Troika — composed of the current, previous, and incoming presidencies — to ensure continuity of the agenda.
The BRICS Youth Council, composed of government representatives and civil society, was consolidated, incorporated new members, and expanded its thematic areas. It now addresses crucial issues such as education, entrepreneurship, science, ecology, volunteering, sports, the fight against hunger, inequalities, and climate change. 

With the new MoU, the BRICS Youth Council will be able to establish partnerships with civil society organizations and NGOs. This will facilitate collaboration with youth entities that see the BRICS agenda as an important space for cooperation and the exchange of best practices in youth public policies.